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Lopez: Constitutional Law: Lowering the Standard of Strict Scrutiny

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LOWERING THE STANDARD OF
STRICT SCRUTINY
Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
MarisaLopez*
Respondents' adopted a law school admissions policy that considered,
among other factors, applicants' race and ethnicity.2 The admissions policy
was designed to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse student
body.3 As part of this policy, admissions officers often considered daily
reports that tracked the number of accepted minorities." The admissions
policy consistently resulted in a correlation between the percentage of
minority applicants and the percentage of minority acceptances.' Under
this policy, Respondents rejected Petitioner's 6 application for admission.'
Petitioner challenged the admissions policy, alleging that it violated her
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection! The District Court held
that Respondents' policy was unconstitutional. 9 The Court of Appeals
reversed."° The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and, in upholding the
For my parents, Jane Foye and Thomas Lopez, for their constant love and encouragement
and for Michael McDonald in gratitude for his support in law school and in life.
1. Respondents were the University of Michigan Law School, the Regents ofthe University
of Michigan, the past Dean of the Law School, the past President of the University of Michigan,
the present Dean of the Law School, and the past Director of Admissions at the Law School.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316-17 (2003).
2. Id. at 316. Respondents' admissions policy required consideration of many factors,
including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, a diversity essay, LSAT score, grade
point average, undergraduate school, undergraduate course selection, race, and ethnicity. Id at 315.
All factors were considered to determine an applicant's potential contribution to the diversity of
the university. Id
3. Id. Respondents specifically sought to achieve a "critical mass" of underrepresented
minority students. Id. at 316. "[T]he Law School's concept of critical mass [was] defined by
reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce." Id. at 330.
4. Id. at318.
5. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
6. Petitioner was Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, with a3.8 grade point average
and a 161 LSAT score. Id. at 316.
*

7. Id.

8. Id. at 316-17. Petitioner also brought her claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. at 317. The instant Court did not consider this claim because Title VI proscribes only
racial classifications that violate equal protection. Id. at 343 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
9. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732
(6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
10. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 752, afd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002). The question presented was "[w]hether
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decision of the court of appeals, HELD that although the admissions policy
was facially discriminatory, it satisfied strict scrutiny because good faith
is presumed. 2
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that "No State
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' 3 Courts have interpreted this to mean that a racial classification
that infringes on an individual's rights is subject to strict scrutiny. 4 Strict
scrutiny requires that the racial classification be justified by a compelling
state interest achieved by narrowly tailored means. 5 Where the
classification is facially neutral, however, good faith will be presumed
absent a showing of discriminatory intent.16
Writing for the plurality in Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakke, 1' Justice Powell found that the University of California's
admissions policy was facially discriminatory, and thus applied strict
scrutiny.' 8 In that case, respondent 9 challenged petitioner's 2" medical

diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting
applicants for admission to public universities." Grutter,539 U.S. at 322.
12. Grutter,539 U.S. at 329, 343-44.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that an
exclusion order for those of Japanese descent was constitutional). Without specifically naming its
test "strict scrutiny," the Court in Korematsu reasoned that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny." Id. The Court in Bakke recognized this statement as one of the first expressions of the
strict scrutiny test. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978)
(plurality opinion); see also E. John Gregory, Diversity is a Value in American HigherEducation,
but it Is Not a Legal Justificationfor Affirmative Action, 52 FLA. L. REV. 929, 931 (2000).
15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. Since Korematsu, the Supreme Court has defined the strict
scrutiny test more specifically, requiring both a "compelling governmental interest" and "narrowly
tailored means." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,235 (1995); see Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 305 (plurality opinion) (requiring a constitutionally permissible and substantial interest and
means that are necessary to the accomplishment of the interest).
16. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 n.27, 318-19 (plurality opinion). Where a policy is neutral on its
face, good faith will be presumed. Id. at 318-19 (plurality opinion). The Court will not apply strict
scrutiny under such circumstances absent a showing of intent to discriminate and a discriminatory
effect. Id. at 289 n.27 (plurality opinion). "Standing alone, [disproportionate impact] does not
trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) (citation omitted) (holding that a police officer qualifying test was not unconstitutional
despite a disparate impact on admissions of black police officers because there was no intent to
discriminate); see also Sharon E. Rush, Beyond Admissions: Racial Equality in Law Schools, 48
FLA. L. REV. 373, 394 (1996).
17. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 314-15, 318 (plurality opinion).
19. Respondent was Allan Bakke. Id. at 276 (plurality opinion). Bakke applied to the medical
school twice. Id. (plurality opinion). The first time he applied he had a good interview score, a 3.46
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school admissions policy, which reserved a specified number of seats for
minority applicants.2 ' Petitioner offered several justifications for its use of
race in the admissions process, including the goal of student body
diversity.22
The plurality first established that this quota was a facially
discriminatory racial classification.23 Accordingly, the plurality applied
strict scrutiny.24 Under this analysis, the plurality recognized petitioner's
asserted interest in student body diversity as part of its academic freedom
under the First Amendment.2 The plurality insisted, however, that a
university could not exercise this academic freedom at the expense of
individual rights.26 The plurality argued that a quota was not the only or
even the most effective means of meeting the goal of student body
diversity.27 Reasoning that individual review of an applicant would provide

grade point average, and a relatively high MCAT score. Id. at 276, 277 n.7 (plurality opinion).
Despite his performance, Bakke was rejected by the medical school. Id. at 276 (plurality opinion).
Bakke complained to Dr. George H. Lowrey, the Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions
Committee, regarding the nature of the admissions policy. Id. (plurality opinion). The next year
Bakke applied again. Id. at 277 (plurality opinion). This time the Associate Dean interviewed
Bakke and gave him a low score. Id. (plurality opinion). Bakke was rejected again. Id. (plurality
opinion).
20. Petitioner was the Medical School of the University of California at Davis. Id. at 269
(plurality opinion).
21. Id.at 275 (plurality opinion). The reserved seats were for selections by the special
admissions committee. Id. at 274 (plurality opinion). The admissions policy was two-tracked and
included both a general admissions committee and a special admissions committee. Id.at 275
(plurality opinion). The special admissions committee was created to ensure representation of
economically disadvantaged students within the entering class. Id. at 272 (plurality opinion).
Despite this purpose, in practice, the committee only admitted minority applicants (often without
regard to their economic status). Id. at 276 (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 305-06 (plurality opinion). Petitioner offered several other interests asjustification
for the special admissions committee, including: "(i) 'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession'; (ii) countering the effects
of societal discrimination; [and] (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in
communities currently underserved." Id. at 306 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (footnote
omitted). The plurality recognized only petitioner's interest in studentbody diversity as compelling.
Id. at 314-15 (plurality opinion).
23. Id.at 289 (plurality opinion).
24. Id.at 290 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 14-15.
25. Id.at 313 (plurality opinion) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
26. Id.at 314 (plurality opinoin). The Bakke plurality stated: "The fatal flaw in petitioner's
preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.at 320 (plurality opinion).
27. Id.at 315 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated: "The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special
admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment
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a race-neutral alternative to a quota,2" the plurality concluded that the
admissions policy was not narrowly tailored.29 The plurality noted that
where such individual review was maintained, courts should presume good
faith on the part of the university.3 ° In Bakke, however, the Court did not
presume good faith and concluded that the university's admissions policy
was unconstitutional.31
Despite the uncertainty caused by the split Court in Bakke, Adarand
Constructors,Inc. v. Pend2 again emphasized that all racial classifications
must be subject to strict scrutiny. 3 In Adarand, a government contract
provided additional compensation to a prime contractor who hired an
economically and socially disadvantaged subcontractor. 4 Federal statutory
law further provided that certain racial and ethnic minorities should be
presumed to be economically and socially disadvantaged.35 Petitioner
challenged this presumption.36
The Court first established that the policy of awarding additional
compensation based on the disadvantage presumption was racially
discriminatory on its face.37 The Court emphasized that good motives were
not enough to justify even a benign racial classification.3" The Court based

of genuine diversity." Id. (plurality opinion).
28. See id.at 318 n.52 (plurality opinion). As an example of individual consideration, the
plurality described Harvard College's admissions program. Id. at 316-17 (plurality opinion). The
Harvard program does not set a quota, but rather considers race or ethnic background as a "plus."
Id. (plurality opinion). The plurality noted specifically that this policy does not insulate any
applicant from competition with other applicants. Id.at 317 (plurality opinion). Under a program
like the one at Harvard, the plurality reasoned, an applicant who is not accepted for the last
available seat was at least considered for admission. Id. at 318 (plurality opinion). As such, that
applicant "would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.(plurality opinion).
29. Id. at 315-16 (plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 318-19 (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 320 (plurality opinion).
32. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
33. Id. at 226.
34. Id. at 205. Under this contract, the prime contractor awarded the subcontract to a small
business certified as economically and socially disadvantaged, although petitioner submitted the
lower bid. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.at 205-06.
37. Id. at 213. The Court stated: "(We note, incidentally, that this case concerns only
classifications based explicitly on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by
laws that, although facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated
by a racially discriminatory purpose.)." Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 226. "'More than good motives should be required when government seeks to
allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification system."' Id. (quoting Drew S.
Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485 (1987)).
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this on the highly suspect nature of all racial classifications.39 The Court
concluded that strict scrutiny should apply even in this case and, as such,
remanded the case so that the lower courts could consider whether the
interests served by the use of the subcontractor compensation clauses were
compelling and whether the means were narrowly tailored to further these
interests.4°
Applying intermediate scrutiny, 4' the Court in United States v.
Virginia4 echoed Bakke and Adarand and held that deference was
inappropriate under any heightened standard of review.43 In Virginia, the
United States challenged the Commonwealth's policy of not admitting
women to its military institute." As a justification for this policy, the
Commonwealth asserted an interest in diversity in education through
single-sex institutions.45
The Court first found that the Commonwealth's total exclusion of
women from the military institute was a gender-based classification.46
Therefore, under intermediate scrutiny, the Court required the
Commonwealth to show an exceedingly persuasive justification for its
policy. 47 The Court in Virginiaimplicitly accepted diversity as a legitimate
goal in higher education. 48 The Court found, however, that the
Commonwealth's policy had not actually been motivated by that goal.49

at 236. Referencing the Japanese exclusion order upheld in Korematsu, the Court
39. See id.
reasoned that even "'the most rigid scrutiny"' can fail. Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). Therefore, the Court insisted that all racial classifications be subject to strict
scrutiny. Id. The Court stated: "Any retreat from the most searching judicial inquiry can only
increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future." Id.
at 237-39.
40. Id.
41. Under this standard, the state must show an "exceedingly persuasive"justification. United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Although the Court in Virginia does not refer to its
test as "intermediate scrutiny," the Court has recognized its analysis as such in other cases. See,
e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,366 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
42. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
43. Id. at 555.
44. Id. at 523. The suit was prompted by a complaint to the Attorney General by a female
high school student who had applied to the military institute. Id.
45. Id. at 535. The Commonwealth also tried to justify its policy by asserting its interest in
providing an adversative training model. Id. at 535, 540. The Court dismissed this justification
because the adversative training model was not inconsistent with the admission of women. Id. at
550. The Court rejected generalizations and stereotypes offered by the Commonwealth that would
indicate that women are not suitable for adversative training. Id.
46. Id. at 530.
47. Id. at 532-33.
48. See id. at 535.
49. Id. The Court reasoned that the Commonwealth's justification of diversity was created
after the fact. Id. at 535-36. The Court based this on the fact that all other colleges and universities
in Virginia are coeducational. Id. at 539-40.
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Reasoning that mere recitation of a benign purpose, such as diversity, does
not satisfy intermediate scrutiny,5 ° the Court concluded that deferential
review was inappropriate and therefore the policy was invalid."
Although the instant Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, it
employed a high level of deference. 2 In determining whether the
university had a compelling state interest, the instant Court gave deference
to Respondents' stated goal of student body diversity.53 The instant Court
also presumed that Respondents were acting in good faith.54 Despite
claims by the dissent that Respondents' actual purpose was racial
balancing, the instant Court accepted Respondents' interest in diversity at
face value.55 The instant Court thus
found that Respondents' interest was
56
scrutiny.
strict
under
compelling
Without explicitly referring to deference or good faith, the instant
Court applied a lenient standard in examining Respondents' means.57
Accordingly, the instant Court found that narrow tailoring did not require
the university to exhaust all race-neutral alternatives where doing so would
risk the quality of education.5" Further, the Court rejected arguments by the
dissent that Respondents' use of daily reports eliminated individual
review.59 The Court also rejected arguments that the number of minorities
admitted reflected an underlying quota.60 Instead, the Court relied
substantially on testimony by admissions officials that individual review

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 555-56.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 329. The instant Court stated its presumption of good faith:
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart
of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and that "good faith" on the part
of a university is "presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary."

Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
55. See id. at 335-37. The majority focused on the fact that the number of minorities admitted
varies significantly from year to year. Id. at 336. The dissent, however, focused on the fact that the
percentage of minorities admitted always correlates to the percentage of minorities who apply. Id.
at 283 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent accused the majority of obscuring this point. Id.
(Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 333, 343.
57. See id. at 333-43.
58. Id.at 339. The Court found that alternative means would require Respondents to sacrifice
diversity. Id. at 340. The Court specifically rejected arguments that Respondents could have used
either percentage plans, which guarantee admission to the top students at in-state public high
schools, or a lottery system. Id.
59. See id. at 336; infra note 74 and accompanying text.
60. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36; infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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was always maintained. 6' Thus, the instant Court held that Respondents'
admissions policy was narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny.62
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, criticized the
Court's deference to Respondents' admissions policy. 63 Justice Thomas
specifically pointed to the apparent contradiction between the Court's
analysis in the instant case and the Court's analysis in Virginia.' He noted
that in Virginia the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, a lower standard
than strict scrutiny.65 Even under this lower standard, the Court in Virginia
did not defer to the Commonwealth's judgment.'
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority's
position that racial classifications may be permissible where they are
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.67 He reasoned,
however, that this case did not satisfy that exacting standard. 6' The Chief
Justice first attacked Respondents' purported goal of student body
diversity as a sham intended to cover up its real goal of racial balancing.69
He supported this theory with evidence that the percentage of minority
applicants admitted correlated to the percentage of minority applications
received.7 ° The Chief Justice concluded that the policy did not satisfy strict
scrutiny. 7
In yet another dissent, Justice Kennedy also criticized the majority's
analysis, questioning whether the Court, in fact, applied strict scrutiny.'
Justice Kennedy argued that the majority confused deference to
Respondents' educational goals with deference to Respondents' chosen
means.7 3 Justice Kennedy specifically noted that the use of daily reports
was a strong indication that individual review was not maintained.74

61. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336. Responding to Justice Kennedy's argument that the daily
reports suggest non-individual review, the instant Court stated, "[T]he Law School's admissions
officers testified without contradiction that they never gave race any more or less weight based on
the information contained in these reports." Id.
62. Id. at 343.
63. Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 378 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 380-81 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 383-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice's dissent included tables
supporting his theory. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The tables showed, for example, that in
1995 the percentage of African-American applicants was 9.7% and the percentage of admitted
applicants who were African-American was 9.4%. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy further rejected the majority's presumption of good
faith.75 He reasoned that strict scrutiny requires the proponent of the racial
classification to carry the burden of proving compliance with the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 6 Justice Kennedy concluded that Respondents in
the instant case had not satisfied this burden and thus the admissions
policy was unconstitutional."
The instant Court changed the application of strict scrutiny analysis by
introducing the idea that deference should be given to a university's
educational goals. 78 The fact that the instant Court even used the word
"deference" is striking in light of its recent decision in Virginia.7 9 In
Virginia, the Court was applying a less exacting standard, but still found
that deferential review was in error)o Despite this holding, the instant
Court relied on Bakke and gave deference to Respondents without ever
acknowledging Virginia.8 Bakke acknowledged the academic freedom of
the university to define its educational goals and decide which students to
admit.82 The plurality insisted, however, that this academic freedom not
come at the expense of individual rights.8 3 Bakke never referred
specifically to deference."
It is not clear that the instant Court's deference is synonymous with the
academic freedom recognized in Bakke. 5 Rather, this deference extends
beyond deference to educational goals and into deference to educational
means." This deference, combined with the presumption of good faith, led
the instant Court to accept Respondents' purported interest in diversity at
face value. 7 Bakke contemplated that the Court would accept the validity
of proposed educational goals but nevertheless skeptically inquire into

75. Id. at 394-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 224 (1995)); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) ("The burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.").
77. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 329. But see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 555.
79. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Virginia,518 U.S. at 555.
80. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 555.
81. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-30.
82. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (plurality opinion).
83. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
84. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (plurality opinion).
85. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (holding that deference should be given to a
university's educational goals), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (holding that a university's academic
freedom cannot come at the expense of individual rights).
86. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated: "The
Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to
the implementation of this goal." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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whether they were the university's actual purpose.8" Accordingly, the
Virginia Court accepted that diversity was a persuasive justification but
found that this was not the Commonwealth's actual purpose. 9 By
accepting Respondents' asserted interests without suspicion, the instant
Court applied a level of deference even greater than that recognized under
intermediate scrutiny.90
The instant Court also shifted the burden of proof recognized by Justice
Kennedy9 ' by applying a presumption of good faith to Respondents'
policy.92 In Bakke the plurality indicated that a presumption of good faith
would be appropriate only where there was no racial classification and
strict scrutiny did not apply.93 The instant Court assumed Respondents'
policy was a racial classification94 but nevertheless recognized a
presumption of good faith for Respondents.95 Thus, the instant Court
effectively shifted the burden of proof under strict scrutiny from the state
actor to the individual.'
The effect of the presumption of good faith can be seen in the fact that
97
the instant Court relied almost exclusively on Respondents' testimony.
The instant Court specifically dismissed evidence of a correlation between
the percentage of minority admittees and minority applicants that may
have suggested an underlying quota. 98 The instant Court also dismissed
evidence that during the admissions process, Respondents' tracking of the
number of minorities admitted eliminated individual review. 99 Instead, the
instant Court relied on Respondents' own assertion of their good faith.°°
This result is inconsistent with the idea that all racial classifications are
highly suspect and subject to the strictest scrutiny.'' By applying a good

88. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 318 (plurality opinion). In
Bakke, the Court held that where there was a facially neutral admissions policy, the Court would
not assume that the university had ulterior motives. Id. (plurality opinion).
89. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
90. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-36, 555 (1996) (discussing that
deferential review is error under intermediate scrutiny), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29 (holding
that deference and a good faith presumption are appropriate under strict scrutiny).
91. Grutter,539 U.S. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); cf Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535-36.
92. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
93. See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text.
94. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
95. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
96. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391-94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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faith presumption
to a racial classification, the instant Court altered strict
02
scrutiny. 1
The new standard created by the instant Court contrasts with its holding
in Adarand.0 3 In Adarand, the Court specifically held that all racial
classifications would be held to strict scrutiny. 'O Based on its deference
and presumption of good faith, however, it is questionable whether the
instant Court actually applied strict scrutiny.' °5 The Adarand Court
reasoned that good motives alone were not enough to satisfy strict
scrutiny.0 6 The new presumption of good faith changes this reasoning.'0 7
In Bakke, the presumption of good faith essentially meant that courts
should uphold policies that are not facially discriminatory in the absence
of discriminatory motives.'0 8 By applying this presumption within strict
scrutiny, the instant Court negated the holding of Adarand.'0 9
Despite the instant Court's unprecedented strict scrutiny analysis, its
outcome is consistent with the holding of Bakke." 0 Bakke clearly supports
applying a good faith presumption where the university first ensures
individual review in its admissions policy."' Under this analysis, however,
there would be no racial classification and thus strict scrutiny would not
apply." 2 The instant Court could have found that the policy of considering
race as one factor in the admissions policy was not a racial
classification." 3 Under that interpretation, the instant Court could have
applied a presumption of good faith and upheld the policy without
invoking strict scrutiny.' "' Instead, the instant Court blended both the good
faith presumption and deference into strict scrutiny
and created a new
115
classifications.
racial
future
for
review
of
standard

102. See generallyGrutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-95 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Compare id. at 328,
with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995).
104. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
105. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text.
109. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. CompareRegents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52, 319-20 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting an admissions policy that does not ensure individual review), with
Grutter,539 U.S. at 337, 343 (upholding an admissions policy that ensures individual review).
111. See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text.
113. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19 (plurality opinion) (holding that where there is
individual review good faith is presumed), with Grutter,539 U.S. at 337 (finding that Respondents'
admissions program ensured individual review).
114. See supra notes 16, 30 and accompanying text.
115. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
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Lopez: Constitutional Law: Lowering the Standard of Strict Scrutiny
CASE COMMRENT

Although the outcome of the instant case is in keeping with precedent,
the analysis by the instant Court could have led to a different outcome in
Virginia.116 In Virginia,six justices " invalidated the institute's admissions
policy, holding that deferential review was error under intermediate
scrutiny."' Five of those same Justices" 9 upheld the policy in the instant
case, holding that deferential review and a good faith presumption were
appropriate under strict scrutiny. 20
It is unclear whether future courts will apply the analysis of the instant
case despite its tendency to produce outcomes that conflict with
Virginia.2 The Court does not appear to have redefined strict scrutiny
only for the facts of the instant case. Adarand requires that the same
standard of review apply to all facial discriminations-benign or not.'
Therefore, the unfortunate effect of the instant case may be to lower the
standard of strict scrutiny even where discrimination is far from "benign."

116. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
117. The sixjustices in the majority were Justice O'Connor, Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy,
Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 518
(1996).
118. Id. at555.
119. Of the six Justices in the majority in Virginia, only Justice Kennedy dissented in the
instant case. Grutter,539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 328. The instant Court stated:
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart
of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and that "good faith" on the part
of a university is "presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary."
Id. at 329 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
121. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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